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ABSTRACT
Public goods and human rights are sometimes treated as intimately
related, if not interchangeable, strategies to address matters of common
global concern. The aim of the present contribution is to disentangle the
two notions to shed some critical light on their respective potential to
attend to contemporary problems of globalization. I distinguish the
standard economic approach to public goods as a supposedly value-
neutral technique to coordinate economic activity between states and
markets from a political conception of human rights law that empowers
individuals to partake in the definition of the public good. On this basis,
I contend that framing global public goods and universal human rights
in terms of interests and values that "we all" hold in common tends to
conceal or evade conflicts about their proper interpretation and
implementation. This raises important normative questions with regard
to the political and legal accountability of global ordering in both
domains. The public goods approach has responded to this problem by
extending the scope of political jurisdiction over public goods to
encompass all those "affected" by their costs and benefits. This finds its
counterpart in attempts in the human rights debate to legally account for
the global human rights impacts of public goods through extending
human rights jurisdiction beyond state territory. By way of conclusion I
contend that both approaches are indicative of a "horizontal"
transformation of statehood under conditions of globalization aimed at
recovering the public good beyond the international order of states.
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. E-mail: D.H.Augenstein@uvt.nl.
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 23 #1 (Winter 2016)
© Indiana University Maurer School of Law
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 23:1
INTRODUCTION
Public goods and human rights are sometimes treated as intimately
related, if not interchangeable, strategies to address contemporary
problems of globalization. In a study sponsored by the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) to make public goods fit for
development, Inge Kaul and her collaborators treat respect for human
rights and international human rights law as a "[gjlobal public good[]"
because its "benefits extend to all countries, people, and generations."'
Others have argued that what ties the two notions together is their
"universal, indivisible and mutually interdependent [nature], founded
on the principle that goods as well as human rights must be accessible
to all."2 Thus, it would appear that what global public goods and
universal human rights share is that they are of common concern to the
whole of humanity. This common concern is expressed through global
interdependencies in the production and consumption of public goods, in
the case of the former, and universal membership in the human family
of rights-bearing subjects, in the case of the latter. Conversely, much of
the appeal of global public goods and universal human rights lies in
their purported ability to transcend the compartmentalization of the
globe into territorial state entities that are increasingly found wanting
in governing the world. Decentering public goods and human rights
from the international order of states thus represents an important
attempt to redress the imbalance between the transboundary impacts of
economic globalization and state-territory-based forms of legal and
political rule.
One of my goals in this contribution is to disentangle the notions of
public goods and human rights and to shed some critical light on their
respective potential to address matters of common global concern. I
distinguish the standard economic approach to public goods as a
supposedly value-neutral technique to coordinate economic activity
between states and markets from a political conception of human rights
law that empowers individuals to partake in the definition of the public
good. This distinction plays off the economic and political
understandings of "public good" as, respectively, the good whose
production requires state intervention to prevent market failures and
1. Inge Kaul & Ronald U. Mendoza, Advancing the Concept of Public Goods, in
PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZATION 78, 95, 98 (Inge Kaul et al.
eds., 2003).
2. Birgit Lindsnos, The Global and the Regional Outlook: How Can Global Public
Goods Be Advanced from a Human Rights Perspective?, in TOWARDS NEW GLOBAL
STRATEGIES: PUBLIC GOODS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 71, 73 (Erik Andr6 Andersen & Birgit
Lindsnoes eds., 2007).
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the good as a normative standard to evaluate the justice of legal
arrangements that make up the state polity.3 On this basis, I contend
that while economic decisions concerning the production, distribution,
and alignment of public goods are an expression of the public good,
human rights play a constitutive role in its political definition.
The different ways in which public goods and human rights relate to
the public good traditionally vested in the nation-state translate into
distinctive challenges to their capacity to address matters of common
global concern. On the one hand, the globalization of public goods absent
a global public good is marked by their functional differentiation. On
the other hand, the constitutive role of human rights in the political
definition of the public good remains confined to the territorial state
legal order. This leads me to my second goal: to show that positing
interests and values that "we all" hold in common is insufficient to
account for public goods and human rights at the global level. To be
sure, the language of global public goods and universal human rights
signals that many challenges bound up with globalization (be it the
mitigation of global climate change or the alleviation of world poverty)
exceed the traditional state-based distinctions between domestic and
foreign politics, and between constitutional and international law. Yet
framing public goods and human rights in terms of common interests
and values tends to conceal or evade conflicts about their proper
interpretation and implementation that persist in the international
order of states. This raises important normative questions about he
political and legal accountability of global ordering in both domains. The
public-goods approach has responded to this problem by extending the
scope of political jurisdiction over public goods to encompass all those
"affected" by their costs and benefits. This finds its counterpart in
attempts in the human rights debate to account legally for the global
human rights impact of public goods by extending human rights
jurisdiction beyond state territory. Taken together, these approaches
suggest a "horizontal" transformation of statehood under conditions of
globalization aimed at recovering the public good beyond the
international order of states.
3. In a similar way, Malcolm Langford distinguishes a "positivistic" approach to
public goods that he associates with Anglo-American welfare economics from a
"constructivist" understanding of public goods as a matter of social construction and social
contestation. See Malcolm Langford, Keeping Up with the Fashion: Human Rights and
Global Public Goods, 16 INT'L J. ON MINORITY & GROuP RTS. 165, 171-75 (2009).
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I. PUBLIC GOODS WITHOUT THE PUBLIC GOOD?
Under the standard economic approach, goods are considered public
if they are non-rival in consumption and have non-excludable benefits.4
Non-rivalry means that one person can consume the good without
diminishing its availability to others; non-excludability means that
people cannot be excluded from the benefits of the good irrespective of
whether they contributed to its production. A commonly used example of
a "pure" public good is clean air, because it is not depleted by breathing
(non-rivalry in consumption) and cannot be appropriated by a few (non-
excludability of benefits).5 The distinguishing feature of public goods (as
opposed to private goods) is that, while their provision is considered to
be in the common interest, the market creates insufficient incentives to
produce them because they cannot be effectively priced and allocated
through market transactions.6 The non-excludability of benefits leads to
an underproduction of public goods since it creates incentives to free
ride on the efforts of others. At the same time, their non-rivalry entails
that public goods can be consumed at no marginal cost, which makes it
inefficient to encourage their production by enhancing their scarcity
value.
Against this background, the core concern behind the standard
economic approach is to identify those goods whose production requires
public (state) intervention to ensure sufficient supply and prevent
market failures. The criteria of non-excludability and non-rivalry
determine whether a good is "public" or "private" and whether,
4. The development of the economic theory of public goods is commonly associated
with Paul Samuelson's discussion of "collective consumption goods." See generally Paul A.
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954).
This theory found its way into political science with Mancur Olson's work on free-rider
problems associated with the production of public goods in large-scale democracies. See
generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
5. Unlike "pure" public goods, "club goods" are non-rival but excludable, while
"common pool resources" are non-excludable but rival.
6. The problems bound up with the production of public goods can vary depending on
the nature of the good in question. In this vein, Bodansky distinguishes between
"aggregate effort" problems where the total supply of the good depends on the aggregate
efforts of all actors involved (as in the case of climate change mitigation); "weakest-link"
problems where the efforts of the vast majority of actors can be undone by a small group
that fails to do its part (for example, hamstringing terrorist financing); and "single-best
effort" problems, such as medical discoveries, where the production of the good only
depends on the effort of an individual or a small group of actors. See Daniel Bodansky,
What's in a Concept? Global Public Goods, International Law, and Legitimacy, 23 EuR. J.
INT'L L. 651, 658-66 (2012).
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accordingly, the state or the market should provide it. This entails that
the very distinction between "public" and "private" goods is drawn with
a view to coordinating economic activity (production and consumption),
which renders the public-as-political a residual category, parasitic on
the logic of market efficiency. The standard economic approach to public
goods thus yields the conclusion
that a good with potentially rival and excludable
properties is-or ought to be-private and that its
provision ought to be left to the market. This means that
the decision about which goods to make private and
which public is seen largely as a technical rather than a
political matter. The state's role becomes one of
providing "market rejects"-non-rival and non-
excludable goods that do not fit the conditions of market
transactions.
7
That Inge Kaul and her collaborators alternate between a positive
("is") and a normative ("ought") approach to public goods is indicative of
the inconclusiveness of the criteria of non-excludability and non-rivalry
in establishing a bright-line distinction between "public" and "private."
To return to the above example, the 'public" good of clean air has,
under modern conditions of large-scale industrial production and
pollution, become rival in many parts of the world. By the same token,
regulation aimed at curbing pollution (be it in the form of prohibitions
or permits) excludes certain actors from the benefits of using clean air
in particular ways without, however, turning it into a "private" good.
That a good may have some rival and excludable properties does not
appear decisive for its categorization as "public" or "private." Moreover,
whether a good has rival and excludable properties is often not a
natural state of affairs but the result of human intervention. As Kaul
and Mendoza say, "[b]efore goods appear in the market or in the
portfolio of state agents, policy choices have been made or norms
established to make the goods private in the sense of being exclusive or
public in the sense of being non-exclusive."8
A related problem arises with regard to the distinction between
public "goods" and public '%ads." Imagine that the air pollution in our
example is a by-product of oil extraction (so-called gas flaring) in a
developing country that has detrimental health impacts on the local oil-
7. Inge Kaul, Pedro Conceigio, Katell Le Goulven & Ronald U. Mendoza, How to
Improve the Provision of Global Public Goods, in PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIc GOODs:
MANAGING GLOBALIZATION, supra note 1 at 21, 23.
8. Kaul & Mendoza, supra note 1, at 86.
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producing community. It may appear commonsensical that the state
should intervene to protect the public good of clean air by curbing the
pollution-intensive production. The problem with this line of argument,
however, is that the criteria of non-rivalry and non-excludability do not
lend themselves to such normative evaluation, with the consequence
that the standard economic approach must presuppose that the
production of any given good or bad is desirable or undesirable. Yet
people (in casu, the oil industry and the oil-producing community,
members of the community employed by the oil industry, those whose
crops are damaged by the carbon fallouts, etc.) will disagree about what
should count as a public "good" and how it should be produced given
limited resources. Once again, the basic point is that the production of
public goods involves political choices that cannot be gauged by a
technical exercise in economic optimization.
A related political blind spot of the standard economic approach is
that its preoccupation with the market-efficient production of public
goods marginalizes the problem of their equitable distribution. The oil
production in our local community may constitute the developing
country's main source of foreign investment and tax revenue, a
significant part of which is used to maintain the public health system.
Instead of a simple conflict between a public "good" (clean air) and a
public "bad" (air pollution), this scenario presents a more complex
challenge involving competing public goods (economic development and
public health), the provision of which may appear to be of overriding
importance especially to those living in other parts of the country. At
the same time, financing the public health system through oil revenues
imposes disproportionate costs on people in the oil-producing
community, who may in turn request a greater share in the benefits to
offset the pollution-induced externalities.
At issue here are political conflicts between actors with different
interests over the distribution of the costs and benefits involved in the
production and consumption of public goods. Economists usually rely on
the market to allocate goods between citizens via a cost-benefit analysis
geared toward wealth maximization. Whatever the merits of such an
approach with regard to "private" goods, it cannot work in relation to
"public" goods that require government intervention precisely in order
to avert market failures. This poses the problem of how to reveal and
aggregate individuals' preferences concerning the equitable distribution
of public goods-a problem that the standard economic approach can
only address either by presupposing that public goods were in fact non-
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rival and non-excludable and therefore distribution-neutral,9 or by
falling back on the political process vested in state-type democracies.10
In sum, the standard economic approach proves unsatisfactory
because, although it needs to concede that in reality most public goods
(and, in any case, all those pertinent to an economic analysis) are
"impure" (i.e., have excludable or rival properties), it denies the
constitutive role of politics in decisions concerning their production,
distribution, and alignment. Its ostensibly technical and value-neutral
definition of public goods on grounds of market efficiency conceals that
the distinction between (what ought to be) public and (what ought to be)
private is itself a public and political decision. Relatedly, allocating the
costs and benefits of public goods on the basis of individual-preference
aggregation presupposes, rather than justifies, a distributive scheme
grounded in the shared commitments of the members of a political
collective. As Loader and Walker argue, by relying on purely
instrumental reasons to overcome the "short-term self-interest and
information[] deficiency of the market model," the standard economic
approach to public goods "assume[s] the very collective commitment to
put things in common in this rather than any other group that it [needs]
to demonstrate."11 A political conception of public goods, by contrast,
must be "predicated upon a set of actual or projected ends which
vindicate the very value of conceiving and pursuing ends as common
ends ... "12 The way in which a political collective comes to conceive
and pursue ends as common ends, finally, elucidates the political role of
the public good in framing decisions and resolving conflicts about the
production, distribution, and alignment of public goods. If the latter
concerns the allocation of goods in matters of public interest, the former
concerns the way in which a political collective relates to its own
publicness. The public good as the "common weal" or the "common good"
is a representation of the general interest that all members of a political
collective hold in common.1 3 Accordingly, economic decisions concerning
particular public goods are but an expression of the public good as a
political relationship aimed at establishing, institutionalizing, and
9. See Meghnad Desai, Public Goods: A Historical Perspective, in PROVIDING GLOBAL
PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZATION, supra note 1 at 63, 71-72.
10. See Gregory Shaffer, International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal
Pluralist World, 23 EUR. J. INT'L L. 669, 683 (2012).
11. IAN LOADER& NEIL WALKER, CIVILIZING SECURITY 162-63 (2007).
12. Id. at 163.
13. For a historical account of the evolution of the public good as the common good
from the Roman notion of "res publica" to a modern republican understanding that
emerged in the context of the Great Revolutions, see Peter Wivel, The State and the
Citizen: Natural Law as a Public Good, in TOWARDS NEW GLOBAL STRATEGIES: PUBLIC
GOODS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (Erik Andr6 Andersen & Birgit Lindsnas eds., 2007).
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accounting for the general interest of the polity. Alternatively, conflicts
about public goods are resolved in the light of the public good through
which individuals come to identify themselves as members of a polity
endowed with a common purpose.
II. ACCOUNTING FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS
The reason I set out to discuss the relationship between public goods
and the public good in the context of the nation-state is that it provides
a fruitful starting point for examining the problem of global public
goods. International law in its classical form has compartmentalized
this relationship within and among territorial state entities. On the one
hand, the public good is confined to the national political community
bounded by the territorial state legal order. This reflects the central role
of the national democratic process in organizing the domestic economy
and resolving conflicts about public goods. On the other hand, the lack
of a global political community that could render decisions about public
goods legitimate in the light of a global public good is compensated by
imposing a consent requirement on states in international law. The
consensual structure of the international legal order is meant to ensure
that states represent the collective political will of their citizens when
resolving conflicts about public goods in their international dealings
with one another. This state-centered approach has increasingly come
under attack for its incapacity to address the transboundary challenges
involved in the production, distribution, and alignment of public goods
under conditions of globalization. The requirement of state consent is
seen as an impediment o the effective solution of global collective action
problems, with commentators urging reform to enhance international
law's problem-solving capacity in matters of common global concern.
14
At the same time, the confinement of the public good to the
territorially-bounded national political community fails to explain why
states should take the political interests of outsiders into account. While
the economic costs and benefits of state-based decisions concerning
public goods are increasingly felt globally, political accountability for
such decisions stops at national borders.15 Two prongs of the global
approach to public goods may be distinguished along these lines. The
first prong attempts to transcend the international order of states from
"above" by foregrounding public interests of common global concern. The
second prong tries to recover political accountability from "below" by
14. For a critical appraisal, see Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law
in an Age of Global Public Goods, 108 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-6 (2014).
15. See, e.g., David Held, Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness from a
Cosmopolitan Perspective, 39 GOV'T & OPPOSITION 364 (2004).
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extending the scope of stakeholders in public goods to encompass all
those affected by their costs and benefits. Both prongs, I argue, suffer
from shortcomings similar to those of the standard economic approach
in that they presuppose, rather than justify, the political terms and
conditions under which public goods are produced, distributed, and
aligned at the global level.
As noted at the outset, one defining feature of global public goods is
that they are said to confer global benefits that "extend to all countries,
people, and generations."16 Indeed, much of the appeal of global public
goods lies in their purported ability to reach beyond the international
order of states in addressing matters of common global concern.
However, positing interests and values that "we all" hold in common at
a sufficiently abstract level to command general consent tends to
conceal or evade political conflicts about their proper interpretation and
implementation. In his contribution to this collection, Neil Walker aptly
depicts this problem in terms of a discrepancy between the global
ambitions of political morality and the localization of political
authority.17 The global-public-goods approach may be seen as
sidestepping the problem of political authority through the apparent
self-evidence of its objectives at the level of political morality. Yet any
effective solution at the level of global political morality is likely to be
undermined by decentralized structures of political authority.
Consider again the example of clean air. It is not difficult to see how
oil production in a developing country confers benefits and produces
costs that transcend state borders. Oil production not only generates
significant financial revenues for those (Western) countries whose
"multi-national" corporations are in charge of the local production
process, but also caters to the energy needs of their domestic economies.
Moreover, the gas flared in the course of the oil extraction constitutes a
major source of carbon-dioxide emissions that accelerate global
warming. Viewed from a global perspective, the most cost-effective way
to curb carbon emissions for the benefit of all concerned may be to re-
insert the gas into the earth's crust or to use it for local energy
production-both involving significant costs for a developing state. In
response, the state may either prioritize national economic development
over global environmental protection, or try to reclaim the costs from
the industrialized world, whether in view of their historical record of
carbon emissions or in mitigation of future climate change. In the latter
vein, some developing countries have proposed to forego further
exploitation of their natural resources in exchange for financial
16. Kaul & Mendoza, supra note 1, at 95.
17. See Neil Walker, Human Rights and Global Public Goods: The Sound of One Hand
Clapping?, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 249, 249 (2016).
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compensation from other states (a practice sometimes pejoratively
referred to as "environmental blackmailing").'
8
One reason why such initiatives have been remarkably unsuccessful
harks back to the problem that the public "good" of clean air and the
public "bad" of air pollution cannot be effectively regulated through
market transactions but instead require state intervention. Another
reason is that states disagree about the allocation of public
responsibilities for preventing global market failures that are bound up
with the underproduction and overconsumption of clean air. Such
political conflicts cannot be resolved by mere appeal to the global public
benefits of reducing air pollution because, as I have argued, what is at
stake is a whole bundle of interconnected public "goods" and '%ads"
whose benefits and costs are distributed unevenly across the
international order of states. In this vein, foregrounding interests and
values of global common concern fails to account for the fact that states'
failure to resolve collective-action problems bound up with the
production, distribution, and alignment of global public goods is also an
expression of conflicting political loyalties they owe to their own
citizens.
The second prong of the global approach to public goods attempts to
address this problem by way of enhancing political accountability for
their transboundary impacts. Here, the emphasis is less on commonality
than on the disjuncture that arises from what David Held has termed a
"breakdown" of the symmetry and congruence between "decision-
makers" and "decision-takers" under conditions of globalization:
Traditionally, the tension between the sphere of
decision-makers and the sphere of decision-takers has
been resolved by the idea of political community - the
bounded, territorially delimited community in which
decision-makers and decision-takers create processes
18. For example, in June 2007, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa offered to forego
oil exploitation in the Amazonian Yasuni Park for the global environmental benefit in
exchange for financial contributions from other states, to be paid into a fund jointly
administered by Ecuador and UNDP: "Ecuador doesn't ask for charity, but does ask that
the international community share in the sacrifice and compensates us with at least half
of what our country would receive, in recognition of the environmental benefits that would
be generated by keeping this oil underground." Rhett Butler, Ecuador: Pay Us Not to
Develop Amazon Oil Reserves, MONGABAY (Apr. 27, 2007), http://news.mongabay.com/
2007/04/ecuador-pay-us-not-to-develop-amazon-oil-reserves/. In August 2013, the initiative
was abandoned due to insufficient contributions from the international state community.
See Jonathan Watts, Ecuador Approves Yasuni National Park Oil Drilling in Amazon
Rainforest, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.theguardian.comlworld/2013/
aug/16/ecuador-approves-yasuni-amazon-oil-drilling.
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and institutions to resolve the problem of accountability.
.Globalization, global governance and global
challenges raise issues concerning the proper scope of
democracy and of a democracy's jurisdiction, given that
the relation between decision-makers and decision-
takers is not necessarily symmetrical or congruent with
respect to territory.19
To redress the ensuing political accountability gap for global public
goods, Kaul and Mendoza have proposed a principle of "equivalence of
publicness" (derived from the notion of fiscal equivalence) that requires
"matching the circle of stakeholders in a particular public good with the
circle of participants in negotiations on its provision .... "2o This is to be
achieved by expanding decision making "across fiscal or political
jurisdictions to encompass all the stakeholders for the good in
question."21 Kaul and Mendoza's approach proceeds from circumscribing
the "scale" of the public good in question (i.e., whether it confers local,
national, regional, or global benefits) to identifying those affected by its
provision, "independent of the subjective evaluation which individuals
attach to the objective benefits derived from the good."22 Though it
extends political jurisdiction over public goods across national-
territorial borders, this approach still falls short of recovering the public
good at the global level.
Absent a global conception of political authority that could anchor
public goods in the general interest of the cosmopolitan polity, the
identification of "all affected" will center on the political stakes that
individuals have in particular global public goods (promoting economic
development, ensuring environmental sustainability, etc.). This entails
that political participation in decisions about global public goods is not
intended to account for the general interest of the polity but is rather
organized around functionally delimited goals shared among those
regulated by a particular process.23 Accordingly, the asymmetry and
incongruence between decision-makers and decision-takers that stems
from the confinement of the public good to the territorial state are
resolved by way of a global functional differentiation of public goods. Yet
19. Held, supra note 15, at 371-72.
20. Kaul & Mendoza, supra note 1, at 91.
21. Id.
22. Id. (quoting Albert Breton, A Theory of Government Grants, 31 CAN. J. ECON. &
POL. SC. 175, 176 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. On the democratic shortcomings of the functional approach to global ordering see
Griinne de Bdrca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.,
221, 242-43, 254 (2008).
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such functional differentiation creates new global asymmetry and
incongruence between those actors with conflicting political stakes in
different public goods that will often act at cross-purposes.24 Moreover,
Kaul and Mendoza's proposal to specify affectedness on the basis of an
objectified account of "benefits" raises similar concerns about de-
politicization as does the standard economic approach. The
determination of "all affected" on socio-empirical grounds conceals the
fact that identifying the relevant stakeholders in any particular global
public good is itself a political question. As Nancy Fraser points out,
demarcating the kinds and degrees of affectedness that are deemed
sufficient to confer political standing on the individual "requires
complex political judgments . . . weighting the relative merits of
alternative interpretations of the all-affected principle, which generate
alternative accounts of the 'who."'25 Seen in this light, the extension of
political jurisdiction across national-territorial borders insulates
normative judgments about "affectedness" from political contestation by
identifying in advance of the political process those with a relevant
stake in decisions about global public goods. Finally, these difficulties
with framing political accountability in the transnational realm
elucidate that the political challenge faced by the global-public-goods
approach is not simply one of "scale" (from local to global) but also one of
"kind" that concerns the transformation of a purely instrumental
conception of public goods into a normative one absent a global public
good that "we all" hold in common.
26
III. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD
) common across a particular community. I am referring to goods
values of common global concern does not suffice politically and legally
to account for human rights at the global level-regardless of whether
one assimilates human rights to global public goods or places them at
the heart of a "global citizenship" that "underwrites the autonomy of
each and every human being, and recognizes their capacity for self-
governance at all levels of human affairs."27 True, the universality of
human rights is sometimes treated as a truism. Human rights are
24. A problem very visible in Kaul and Mendoza's scheme of global public goods is that
it lists "[r]espect for human rights" next to "[r]espect for national sovereignty" and
"[m]ultilateral trade agreements." See Kaul & Mendoza, supra note 1, at 98.
25. NANCY FRASER, Two Dogmas of Egalitarianism, in SCALES OF JUSTICE:
REIMAGINING POLITICAL SPACE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD, 30, 40 (2010).
26. I borrow this distinction between "scale" and "kind" from LOADER & WALKER, supra
note 11, at 239-45.
27. Held, supra note 15, at 387.
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universal because they belong to all human beings by virtue of their
being human; or, put the other way around, unless they are universal
rights they cannot be human rights:
Human rights are equal rights: one either is or is not a
human being, and therefore has the same human rights
as everyone else (or none at all). They are also
inalienable rights: one cannot stop being human, no
matter how badly one behaves nor how barbarously one
is treated. And they are universal rights, in the sense
that today we consider all members of the species Homo
sapiens "human beings," and thus holders of human
rights.
28
In spite of their proclaimed universal normativity, human rights are
a scarce resource with benefits distributed very unevenly across the
globe. Geography plays a decisive role in the global birth lottery, and
most "Northerners" happen to live a freer and more equal life than
people in the "Global South." Moreover, the criteria for membership in
the human family are far from settled, with prospective candidates
having ranged from slaves, black people, women, Jews, and
homosexuals to corporations that claim their "human" rights to privacy,
property, and so on, against the rest of "us."29 This inclusion/exclusion
dilemma is rooted in the well-known difficulty of "mapping" humanity's
universality-by- abstraction onto concrete rights-bearing subjects
possessing a particular nationality, gender, age, race, class, and so on.
Finally, people tend to disagree about their concrete due in human
rights. Under conditions of political pluralism, any account of rights will
"face disagreements about the interests it identifies as rights, and the
terms in which it identifies them. Those disagreements will in turn be
vehicles for controversies about the proper balance to be struck between
some individual interest and some countervailing social
consideration."30 It is not only these rival and conflictive properties of
human rights that frustrate any easy attempt to assimilate them to (the
standard economic approach to) public goods. An assessment from the
28. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 10 (2d ed.
2003).
29. The European Court of Human Rights, for example, has considered a company "an
independent living organism . . . whose rights also receive autonomous protection under
the European Convention on Human Rights." See Comingersoll S.A. v Portugal, 2000-IV
Eur. Ct. H. R. 355 (2000) (Rozakis, J., concurring).
30. Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 18, 30 (1993).
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vantage point of their purported non-rivalry and non-excludability also
misses the political thrust of claiming human rights as correlative to
public duties to respect, protect, and fulfill them-duties that are not
subservient o imperatives of economic efficiency.3 1 In the case of an oil-
rich developing state, while ownership of the land from which the oil is
extracted may be considered a "private" good (because land is treated as
a rival commodity of exclusionary use to its owner), the question of who
(if anyone) is entitled to lay claim to this land as a matter of (private
property) right is a public and political question.32
The latter distinction between land ownership as a private good and
the public allocation of rights to private property sheds light on the
internal relationship between human rights protection and democratic
self-legislation. Far from being "pre-political" individual entitlements,
rights-based claims to private property require an authoritative
determination by and for a political community as a whole. Human
rights become determinate (in the face of abstraction) and authoritative
(in the face of conflict) through their emplacement in political
relationships individuated within the state legal order. Human rights
are those rights that human beings must accord to each other as
members of a polity to legitimately regulate their common affairs under
positive law. By empowering those subjected to the state's legal
commands to view themselves as their authors, human rights enable
individuals to consider state power not merely in terms of factual
constraints on their freedom but also as the legitimate expression of
collective political will-formation.33 As Habermas puts it, "[p]opular
sovereignty and human rights provide the two normative perspectives
from which an enacted, changeable law is supposed to be legitimated as
a means to secure both the private and civic [public] autonomy of the
individual."34 On the one hand, in the traditional liberal view, human
rights erect legitimate barriers to the encroachment of public
authorities on the private autonomy of individual legal subjects. On the
31. In this vein, Lindsnaes considers human rights "complementary" to the standard
economic approach to public goods because they counteract the latter's "strategic"
rationality. See Lindsnas, supra note 2, at 74.
32. This distinction is in principle commensurable with considering the right to private
property a global public good because it averts the "tragedy of the commons." Yet it should
also be noted that the latter view is premised on certain empirical assumptions about the
beneficial relationship between the institutionalization of private property regimes and
the exploitation of natural resources for which at least the members of a local community
suffering from oil-induced environmental degradation will have little patience.
33. See JURGEN HABERMAS, Remarks on Legitimation Through Human Rights, in THE
POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION 113, 114-15 (Max Pensky ed. & trans., MIT Press 2001)
(1998).
34. Id. at 116.
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other hand, the protective role of human rights in relation to individual
freedom cannot be imposed on popular sovereignty in the form of
external constraints. Those benefiting from human rights as private
individuals must also be able to understand themselves as their authors
in the exercise of their public autonomy through democratic self-
legislation:
For, in the final analysis, private legal subjects cannot
enjoy even equal individual liberties if they themselves
do not jointly exercise their civic [public] autonomy in
order to specify clearly which interests and standards
are justified, and to agree on the relevant respects that
determine when like cases should be treated alike and
different cases differently.35
At the same time, the substantive content of legal human rights
cannot be derived from a predetermined ethical self-understanding of
national community. Rather, a political collective that commits to
protecting human rights empowers individuals to invoke humanity
against the polity. Hence, human rights neither entail legal
entitlements that human beings possess in advance of democratic self-
legislation, nor are they simply the product of collective will-formation
among citizens. Rather, the tension between human rights' universal
normativity and their institutionalization in particular legal orders is
resolved, in an ever-provisional way, through a reflexive political
process in which members of the polity recognize each other both as
legal subjects and as individual human beings.36
Finally, the internal relationship between human rights protection
and democratic self-legislation explains the constitutive role of human
rights in relation to the public good vested in the nation-state. By
according legal protection to human rights, a political collective
empowers individuals to stake a political claim in the definition of the
public good that establishes, institutionalizes, and accounts for the
general interest of the polity. Take the example of the human right to a
"general satisfactory environment" that is invoked by members of an oil-
producing community against the state and, indirectly, the oil industry
35. JORGEN HABERMAS, On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and
Democracy, in THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER 253, 262 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff
eds. 1999).
36. Habermas conceives of this tension in terms of the "Janus-faced" nature of human
rights, looking both to the open-ended and transformative discourse of universal morality
and to their ethical-political institutionalization in particular legal orders. See HABERMAS,
supra note 33, at 118.
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 23:1
itself.37 An individual's claim that her rights were violated by oil-
induced environmental damages is judged in relation to the general
interest of a political community, as reflected in its embedded
understanding of, say, "the rights of others" and "the common
interest."38 If such a claim is successful, it transforms the very
boundaries of the polity and translates into a new self-understanding of
what the political community understands the human right to a
satisfactory environment to be. That the concrete content of the right is
determined in relation to the polity's "common interest" illustrates how
the rights-based protection of particular individuals and groups is at the
same time of common concern to the political collective as a whole.39 For
the same reason, human rights cannot be conceived as a functionally
differentiated policy domain geared towards the realization of particular
interests. The scope of protection of human rights is not contingent on
the nature of the interfering policy measure but determined in relation
to the general interest of the polity. It is immaterial to the assessment
of the ambit of the human right to a generally satisfactory environment
whether this right is interfered with in the state's pursuit of national
energy production, economic development, or other ends. Inasmuch as
human rights are of concern to all sectors of government activity, they
mandate legal protection that cuts across functional differentiations.
40
37. Article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights protects the right
to a general satisfactory environment. African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, art. 24, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982)
[hereinafter African Charter], available at http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/achpr/
banjul charter.pdf.
For an illustration of the multi-faceted human rights challenges raised by this example,
see the famous "Ogoniland decision" of the African Commission on Human and Peoples
Rights, Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social
Rights v. Nigeria, Communication 155/96 African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights [Afr. Comm'n H.P.R.], 50-52 (Oct. 27, 2001), available at
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/30th comunications/155.96/achpr30_155_96_eng.pdf.
38. See, e.g., African Charter, supra note 36, art. 27(2). Other regional and
international human rights conventions contain similarly worded limitation clauses.
39. For a related argument from the domain of ethics that shows how human rights
are rendered determinate by virtue of the "formal and material constraints" imposed upon
them, see JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS 174 (2008).
40. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this "cross-sectoral balancing" role of human rights has
received particular attention in debates concerning human rights protection in the
functionally differentiated European Union polity. See, e.g., Neil Walker, Human Rights
in a Postnational Order: Reconciling Political and Constitutional Pluralism, in SCEPTICAL
EssAYs ON HUMAN RIGHTS 119, 136 (Tom Campbell, K. D. Ewing & Adam Tomkins eds.,
2001) (discussing the idea that human rights span different bodies and establishments);
Philip Alston & J. H. H. Weiler, An 'Ever Closer Union' in Need of a Human Rights Policy:
The European Union and Human Rights, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 23 (Philip
Alston ed., 1999).
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In sum, the constitutive role of human rights in relation to the public
good consists in their contribution to the legitimation of state power by
representing the general interest of the polity that is not reducible to
the aggregated economic self-interest of "isolated" liberal individuals or
the provision of functionally differentiated public goods.
IV. DECENTERING HUMAN RIGHTS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER OF
STATES
If the globalization of public goods is marked by their functional
differentiation, international law has traditionally confined the
constitutive political role of human rights in relation to the public good
to the territorial state legal order. Human rights' universal aspirations
constantly run up against the territorial limitations inherent in the
state-centered architecture of international law. To be sure, some argue
that human rights treaties have a distinctive status in the body of
general public international law, be it because they embody universal
values of the international community of states and operate as an
international ordre publique, or because the fulfillment of a state's
international human rights obligations is not conditional upon
reciprocity by other states.4 1 This notwithstanding, international law
has traditionally not generated individual entitlements to human rights
protection by everyone and everywhere, but has instead confined them
to a territorially-circumscribed relationship between public authorities
and private individuals. As a default rule, each state has a singular
legal obligation and prerogative (to the exclusion of other states) to
respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights of individuals located in its
own territory in relation to acts of its own public authorities. This
territorial compartmentalization of human rights in the international
order of states, in turn, bears out the political division of labor between
constitutional and international law.42 As I suggested in Part III,
human rights in their constitutional form contribute to the
transformation of state power into legitimate forms of legal authority by
41. See, e.g., Matthew Craven, Legal Differentiation and the Concept of the Human
Rights Treaty in International Law, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 489, 491, 511 (2000) (discussing
the different views of human rights treaties, including the beliefs that the treaties might
embody international community values or function as an international ordre publique);
Bruno Simma, International Human Rights and General International Law: A
Comparative Analysis, in 4 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW, no.
2, 153, 195 (1995) (noting that typical human rights treaties lack reciprocity between
parties).
42. On the distinction between the constitutional and international dimensions of
human rights law, see generally Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional
Rights: Harmony and Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863 (2003).
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empowering individuals to partake in the political definition of the
public good individuated in the territorial state legal order. At the
international level, by contrast, human rights take the form of political
agreements between states that oblige each state to respect, protect,
and fulfill the rights of individuals within the territorial confines of its
own legal order. As a consequence, the impact on human rights of state
decisions concerning the production, distribution, and alignment of
global public goods on individuals in other states is not traditionally
mitigated by corresponding extraterritorial human rights obligations.
Kaul and Mendoza's proposal to extend political jurisdiction over
global public goods to encompass all those "affected" by their costs and
benefits finds a correlation in attempts in the human rights debate to
ensure legal accountability for extraterritorial human rights violations
by extending human rights jurisdiction beyond state territory. In
general public international law, jurisdiction fulfills "the function of
regulating and delimiting the respective competences of States" to
lawfully rule over "conduct in matters not exclusively of domestic
concern."43 Jurisdiction circumscribes the conditions under which a
state can prescribe and enforce its laws on the territory of another state,
in accordance with an internationally recognized basis of jurisdiction
and subject to a reasonableness test.44 International law thus delimits a
state's legal authority over individuals outside its borders by virtue of
the authority that other states wield over their territory and people
therein. As a consequence, although international law does not
explicitly tie human rights jurisdiction to state territory,45 their
compartmentalization in the international order of states appears to
warrant a "primarily territorial" interpretation that renders
extraterritorial human rights protection "exceptional" and in need of
43. See F. A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 111 RECUEIL
DES COURS 1, 9, 15 (1964).
44. See JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
456-86 (8th ed. 2012).
45. Article 1 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms simply provides that states shall "secure" human rights "to
everyone within their jurisdiction." European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. Article 2(1) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights tasks each state party to respect
and ensure human rights "to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976). Other international human rights treaties, including the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights do not contain a jurisdiction clause at
all. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. D, 95-2 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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special justification.46 However, the question of whether states are
obliged to protect the human rights of individuals outside their borders
is not reducible to the question of whether they are entitled to do so
pursuant to an internationally recognized basis of jurisdiction.
Otherwise, a state could circumvent its obligations under international
human rights treaties by exceeding its competences under general
public international law.47 The conditions under which an individual
comes under the human rights jurisdiction of a state are thus different
from those pertaining to the legality of state action under the general
international law of jurisdiction. Whereas the latter regulates the
state's legal authority over conduct not exclusively of domestic concern,
the former regulates the state's obligations when exercising de facto
power and control over an area or individual outside its borders.
In this vein, the United Nations Human Rights Committee
concludes that "a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid
down in the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] to
anyone within the power or effective control of that State party even if
not situated within the territory of the State Party .... [and] regardless
of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was
obtained . . . ,,48 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has
held that the decisive factor for establishing human rights jurisdiction is
the state's "exercise of physical power and control," whether lawful or
unlawful, over the individual in question.49 The allocation of human
rights obligations to states is thus not predicated on citizenship or
territory but on state power and control over the individual rights-
holder. Per the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, "the
inquiry turns not on the presumed victim's nationality or presence
within a particular geographic area, but on whether, under the specific
circumstances, the State observed the rights of a person subject to its
authority and control. '50 Similar views have been expressed by other
46. See Bankovi v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333 59, 61.
While the bulk of Bankovi has meanwhile been overruled, the Court continues to hold fast
to the view that extraterritorial human rights protection is exceptional and in need of
special justification in light of the sovereign territorial rights of other states. See AJ-Skeini
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589 (2011).
47. On this distinction, see generally Daniel Augenstein & David Kinley, When Human
Rights 'Responsibilities' Become 'Duties. The Extra-Territorial Obligations of States that
Bind Corporations, in HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT? 271 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013).
48. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Mar. 29, 2004, General Comment No. 31 [80]: The
Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 10,
U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/21/Rev. 1/Add. 13 (May 26, 2004).
49. AI-Skeini, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R 136.
50. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 109/99,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. 37 (1999).
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United Nations treaty bodies, including the committee tasked with the
interpretation of the International Covenant on Social, Economic and
Cultural Rights,5 1 and the International Court of Justice.52 Importantly,
the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties is not confined
to situations in which state agents operate on foreign soil but also
captures conduct in the state's territory that infringes on the rights of
individuals outside its borders. Both the European Court of Human
Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have
recognized that "acts and omissions" of state agents that merely
"produce effects" outside the state's territory can bring an individual
under that state's human rights jurisdiction.5 3 For some United Nations
treaty bodies, this implies that states have extraterritorial obligations to
"prevent[] their own citizens and national entities" from violating
human rights in other countries.5 4 Similarly, the Maastricht Principles
define extraterritorial human rights obligations as "relating to the acts
and omissions of a State, within or beyond its territory, that have effects
on the enjoyment of human rights outside [its borders]."5
There is a lively doctrinal discussion about the feasibility and
desirability of extending international human rights obligations beyond
state borders that addresses, among other questions, the precise
requirements of (effective) state power and control, the distinction
between jurisdiction and state responsibility, the role of attribution in
51. For an overview of the relevant Treaty Body commentary, see generally Olivier De
Schutter et al., Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of
States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 34 HUM. RTS, Q. 1084 (2012).
52. In its advisory opinion on the legality of the wall in occupied Palestinian territory,
for example, the International Court of Justice endorsed the view of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that "the state party's obligations under the
Covenant apply to all territories and populations under its effective control." See Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, 112 (July 9). On this basis, the Court held that the
construction of the wall impeded, inter alia, "the exercise by the persons concerned of the
right to work, to health, to education and to an adequate standard of living as proclaimed
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and in the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child." Id. 134 (referencing ESCOR,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Israel, 15, 31, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.90 (May 23, 2003)).
53. See Al-Skeini App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 133; Saldaflo v. Argentina,
Petitions and Cases Declared Inadmissible, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 38/99,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. 17 (1999).
54. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts, General Comment 19, The Right to
Social Security, 54, Rep. on its 39th Sess., Nov. 5-23, 2007, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/19 (Feb.
4, 2008).
55. ETO CONSORTIUM, MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF STATES IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 6
(2013), quoted in De Schutter et al., supra note 51, at 1101.
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relation to both, and the problem of causation.56 While these debates are
undoubtedly important in spelling out more concretely the conditions for
an extraterritorial application of international human rights treaties,
they should not distract from the underlying normative concerns.
Doctrinal arguments about the conditions under which a state can be
held legally accountable for extraterritorial human rights violations
reflect normative judgments about the appropriate role of human rights
in construing an agency relationship between that state and an
individual located outside its borders. Human rights jurisdiction thus
circumscribes a rights-based "relationship between the individual and
the State in relation to [violations of human rights] wherever they
occurred."57 In Part III, I argued that, by empowering individuals to
partake in the definition of the public good, human rights enable them
to consider state power not merely as a factual constraint on their
freedom but also as the legitimate expression of collective political will-
formation. On the one hand, disentangling human rights jurisdiction
from state territory yields an extension of rights-based entitlements to
all individuals under the state's power and control, wherever located.
This ensures legal accountability for the global human rights impacts of
state-based decisions concerning the production, distribution, and
alignment of public goods. On the other hand, however, it severs the
internal relationship between human rights protection and democratic
self-legislation traditionally vested in the territorial state legal order. In
place of this relationship, disentangling human rights jurisdiction and
state territory confronts the state polity with the human rights claims of
individuals outside its borders who are concerned by, and therefore have
a legitimate say in, the political definition of the state's public good as a
representation of the general interest that all of its members hold in
common. Seen in this light, similarly to the global-public-goods
approach, extending human rights jurisdiction beyond state territory
does not give rise to a global conception of political authority that could
render decisions about public goods legitimate in the light of a global
56. See, e.g., GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Malcolm Langford et
al. eds., 2012); MARCO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY (2011); MICHAL GONDEK, THE REACH OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD: EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES (2009); SIGRUN SKOGLY, BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS: STATES' HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (2006); EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004).
57. Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. on its 13th Sess., July 29, 1981, Comm. No. 52/1979
(Saldias de Lopez v. Uru.), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 88 12.2 (July 1984) (emphasis
added).
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public good. It merely decenters the constitutive role of human rights in
the definition of the public good from the nation-state, in order to
contribute to the transformation of the facticity of state power into
legitimate legal authority beyond state borders.
V. CONCLUSION: PUBLIC GOODS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF STATEHOOD
Attempts to account for global public goods are marked by a tension
between economic concerns with their efficient production, distribution,
and alignment in and for a global market, and the localization of
political and legal authority in the international order of states. At the
same time, global interdependencies in the production and consumption
of public goods challenge the nation-state as a blueprint for a
territorially-confined political community in which collective-action
problems are resolved in the light of the public good. This challenge, so I
have argued, cannot be satisfactorily addressed by positing interests
and values of common global concern-be it in terms of global costs and
benefits associated with public goods, or in terms of universal
membership in the human family of rights-bearing subjects. Rather, it
requires us to revisit our state-centered assumptions about the nature
and operation of law and politics under conditions of globalization. In
this vein, scholars of political cosmopolitanism and global
constitutionalism have advanced arguments in favor of a further
"vertical" integration of the international order of states that accounts
for the cross-functional and transboundary impacts of public goods on
human wealth and well-being.
Political cosmopolitans envisage the creation of a democratic world
system that, for many, should take the form of a suitably reformed
United Nations. David Held, for example, imagines a "global assembly"
that brings together all states and agencies to authoritatively rule over
a world citizenry endowed with equal rights and duties: this "posits the
idea of a global political order in which people can enjoy an equality of
status with respect to the fundamental processes and institutions which
govern their life expectancy and life chances."58 In a similar vein,
Jiirgen Habermas sees a world once dominated by nation-states in
transition toward a "postnational constellation of a global society" that
governs itself through a "global domestic politics without world
58. Held, supra note 15, at 386.
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government.., embedded within the framework of a world organization
with the power to impose peace and implement human rights."
59
If political cosmopolitanism aims at enhancing the global democratic
legitimacy of public goods, scholars of global constitutionalism call for a
further integration of international law to ensure legal accountability
for their global human rights impacts. Here, the functional
differentiation of global politics finds its counterpart in an increasing
fragmentation of international law. If "increased globalization generates
pressures for greater numbers of international rules in more areas of
international life," the "greater density of international norms in greater
numbers of functionally separate international regimes heightens the
dangers associated with the fragmentation of international law."
6 0
Moreover, the transboundary impacts of global public goods require a
more robust account of international law's procedural and substantive
legitimacy that compensates for the global shortcomings, and redresses
the methodological nationalism, of constitutionalism's state-centered
heritage.6 1 In this vein, global constitutionalism views national
constitutional law and international public law as bound together by a
set of common constitutional principles that govern the globe in matters
of general public concern. Within this broader framework, the global
constitutionalization of human rights subjects international politics to a
public-reason constraint that requires states to take the legitimate
concerns of "outsiders" into account.62
What I have dubbed the "vertical" integration of the international
order of states remains parasitic on a notion of statehood as a political
collective individuated in the territorial state legal order-whether, as
with political cosmopolitanism, its form is integrated into a democratic
world political system or, as with global constitutionalism, its substance
is adjusted in light of a set of global constitutional principles. By
contrast, the approaches discussed in this contribution-the extension
of political jurisdiction over decisions concerning global public goods and
the extension of legal jurisdiction over their global human rights
impacts-point toward a "horizontal" transformation of statehood across
59. JORGEN HABERMAS, Does the Constitutionalization of International Law Still Have
a Chance?, in THE DIVIDED WEST 115, 136 (2006).
60. Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, A Functional Approach to International
Constitutionalization, in RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3, 9 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009).
61. See Anne Peters, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of
Fundamental International Norms and Structures, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 579, 580 (2006).
62. See generally Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the
Relationship Between Constitutionalism in and Beyond the State, in RULING THE WORLD?
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 60, at
258.
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national-territorial borders that transcends the state-based distinctions
between domestic and foreign politics and between constitutional and
international law. Both approaches come with problems of their own.
The extension of political jurisdiction over public goods to encompass all
those "affected" by their costs and benefits comes at the price of their
global functional differentiation geared toward the realization of
particular interests. The extension of human rights jurisdiction beyond
state territory, in turn, severs the internal relationship between human
rights and democratic self-legislation in accounting for the general
interest of the state polity. Yet, taken together, they may be seen as an
incremental attempt to recover the public good beyond the international
order of states. To the extent that global interdependencies in the
production and consumption of public goods have blurred the state-
based distinction between domestic and foreign politics, the global-
public-goods approach provides presumptive justifications for state
intervention to prevent "market failures" in matters of common global
concern. To be legitimate, such global assertions of state power must be
accompanied by the recognition of the rights-based claims of those
affected by, and to therefore have a legitimate say in, the definition of
the state's public good. This, finally, entails a political reading of the "all
affected" principle that settles conflicts about global public goods in light
of normative judgments about the appropriate role of human rights in
mediating the tension between state power and legitimate legal
authority beyond the state-based constitutional/international law
divide.
